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Health and Harmony Consultation Paper Defra 
This evidence is written by Dr Ludivine Petetin from Cardiff University and Dr Mary Dobbs, 
from Queen’s University Belfast. Both Ludivine Petetin and Mary Dobbs are Lecturers in Law 
with expertise in agri-environmental issues who have been engaging with stakeholders in 
Wales and Northern Ireland respectively on the impact of Brexit. They are currently writing a 
book on Brexit and Agriculture. 
 
1. On first blush, the consultation paper seems to support a truly green, productive and 
holistic agricultural policy – one that also provides value for money and promotes 
economically viable farming. However, on closer inspection a range of issues arise in 
practice. The ones highlighted herein relate to: (I) the removal of the Basic Payment 
Scheme; (II) the concept of ‘public money for public goods’; (III) environmental 
imbalances; (IV) devolution; and (V) trade. 
 
(I) Removal of Basic Payment Scheme/direct payments and the impact on small 
farms 
 
2. The consultation paper proposes to reduce BPS payments during the transitional period 
and then to remove these entirely after the transitional period. Therefore, BPS will 
disappear in England at least by c. 2025 (the paper does not dictate any such approach 
for the devolved regions but may nonetheless influence regional approaches for 
instance due to trade policy, lack of a regional approach and control of purse strings). 
 
3. Whilst the proposed policy provides for continuation of support through other 
mechanisms, most farmers and their advisers are not (fully) aware that BPS will shortly 
disappear. As a result of the miscommunication arising from the Health and Harmony 
Consultation Paper, there is a danger that farmers will not be given enough time to 
adjust to the changes that will be required of them for them to be profitable enough 
when BPS are removed. The Government/DEFRA should better communicate its 
policy plans to remove BPS to farmers (and the availability of alternative support) in 
order to enable farmers to prepare for the upcoming changes. 
  
4. With appropriate communication, the proposed focus on increased productivity and 
furthering this through for instance technological innovation would allow farms – on 
average – to remain profitable after the abolition of CAP payments. The policy 
promotes productivity for farmers through using targeted inputs more efficiently, 
investing more efficiently and diversification. 
 
5. However, some farms which are currently struggling – even with direct payments 
coming from the EU – will find the change in the support system particularly difficult. 
Many UK farms are currently profitable solely because of direct payments coming from 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). A good rule of thumb is that direct payments 
pay the rent. 
 
6. If DEFRA perseveres with such a radical change in agricultural policy that will only 
support ‘income foregone’ interpreted in a strict manner, it is likely that the bottom 25% 
of farms that currently struggle or only survive because of the receipt of BPS will 
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disappear. The 50% of farmers in the middle will succeed in moving away from direct 
payments to environmental payments as they become more profitable. The top 25% 
will barely feel the change in policy since they are already successful. (see comments 
made by Ludivine Petetin at the Game and Wildlife Conservation Trust All-Party 
Parliamentary Group in March 2018, https://www.gwct.org.uk/policy/appg/march-
2018/; in the Farmers Guardian, https://www.fginsight.com/news/news/defra-makes-
decision-to-let-quarter-of-uk-farms-disappear-57116; and in UK Business Insider; 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/quarter-english-farms-bankrupt-after-brexit-2018-4) 
  
7. Protection of small farms is significant for multiple reasons, tied to the multifunctional 
nature of agriculture. They contribute in rural areas to the culture, society, economy 
(including directly through farming and tourism) and environment. Although ensuing a 
‘level of farm income’ is not an objective of the consultation paper,1 the value of small 
farms is noted in the consultation paper in the context of uplands – with suggestions 
that they may merit further protection. From an environmental perspective, small farms 
or considerable variations and patchy farms are fundamental to the development and 
maintenance of biodiversity – including genetic diversity of crops. Productivity is 
important to resilience of farming, but this diversity is fundamental to agri-
sustainability, environmental sustainability and food security – including on a national 
and global level. 
 
8. Protection may be possible via other financial mechanisms. Thus, the idea of ‘public 
money for public goods’ noted below could provide a mechanism to fund these smaller 
farms through linking in to their contributions within rural communities and the 
environment. Arguably their nature merits further financial support through 
contributing to the maintenance of public goods. However, this would require the public 
goods to be interpreted liberally (see below). Further, there is the potential for funding 
through a rural development fund, but as noted below there is currently very limited 
support/focus in the consultation paper for this. Again, rural development should 
continue to be supported to avoid growing discrepancies within the country and to 
ensure a decent standard of living in rural communities. 
 
9. This scenario could be worse in the other regions of the UK since they rely more heavily 
on CAP support. For instance, in Northern Ireland approximately 4/5 of farms are 
considered to be ‘very small’ (DAERA, 2018, p. 41). These are not economically viable 
without considerable financial support – currently provided for via CAP (directly and 
indirectly). The nature of NI does not facilitate large scale farming as one might find in 
England. Yet, once supported, the agri-food industry is a significance source of 
employment and foundation for much of the economy in NI. If the farmers did not 
continue as is, this would have considerable negative knock-on effects in NI. The 
situation is further complicated by the phyiscal border with the Republic of Ireland and 
the interconnected nature of the supply chain on the island (Dobbs, McGowan, Melo 
Araujo, & Gravey, 2017). 
  
10. It should also be noted that the aim of reducing the direct payments and introducing 
caps is to facilitate developing the capacity of farmers to adjust to the changes, i.e. 
financial savings will be needed and are being sought. However, as there are already 
                                                 
1 Prof Alan Matthews, March 2018 http://capreform.eu/a-tale-of-two-policy-documents-defra-vs-commission-
communication/  
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caps in the other devolved regions (Gravey, Burns, & Jordan, 2016), large cuts would 
therefore be required to save any money and most farms will not survive any cuts. In 
other words, such an approach would be self-defeating in the other regions. Yet, without 
financial support from Westminster, continuation of BPS may not be feasible even into 
the transitional period. 
 
 
(II)  ‘Public money for public goods’ 
11. Part of the current Green Brexit drive aims to modify the support farmers receive for 
the farming activities they undertake. Focus on ‘public money for public goods’ is 
under development within DEFRA. The expression ‘public money for public goods’ in 
agriculture is not new. It has existed in EU CAP documents since the 1990s and is not 
a concept created by DEFRA.  
 
12. A public good is often defined as ‘a good or service in which the benefit received by 
any one party does not diminish the availability of the benefits to others, and where 
access to the good cannot be restricted’ – see for instance the 2011 UK National 
Ecosystem Assessment report. Clean air, soil water storage (yielding flood control), 
beautiful views over a landscape and rural vitality are often cited as examples of such 
public goods.  
 
13. The term public goods utilised by DEFRA in the Command Paper does not accurately 
reflect the environmental outcome-based payments the government wants to create for 
three main reasons. First, it is often understood by stakeholders that public goods are 
tangible goods that are the results of processes of production or manufacture whilst 
most public goods are intangible. Second, the term leads to complexity when the 
benefits of production of marketed goods are privatised (food) and non-marketed 
services (including good environmental land management) are encompassed under the 
term. And, third, to put it simply, public goods tend to be ‘services or goods not 
rewarded by the market’. However, when reading the consultation, productivity appears 
to be identified as a public good (Consultation Paper p. 34). Supporting farmers to 
increase their productivity does not sit well within the new paradigm for payments for 
ecosystem services (PES). Productivity aims to create a more efficient and effective 
agriculture that can result in greater economic success. Ultimately, this success would 
be rewarded by the market. Misunderstanding would diminish if the terms utilised were 
instead environmental benefits/outcomes or ecosystem services. These terms should 
have been preferred since they better reflect the ongoing momentum towards agri-
sustainability and the goal of supporting farmers to deliver environmental outcomes 
and ecosystem services. 
  
14. Further, this emphasis on ‘public goods for public money’ or PES means a lesser focus 
on rural development. The Consultation Paper does not seem to focus on rural 
communities/rural vitality/rural employment contrary to what currently exists under 
Pillar 2 of the CAP. Further, it does not embrace a comprehensive and holistic approach 
to agriculture. The Consultation Paper appears to uphold the stigma that rural areas are 
perceived as ‘left behind’ places and should become more like urban areas to become 
more attractive and to develop economically. This perspective has often been the 
position of the UK government approach towards rural areas. Rural areas and their 
communities are not viewed for the intrinsic values, goods and services they create. 
This new focus on PES could change this approach and lead to a regeneration of rural 
4 
 
areas and their thriving communities. This can be achieved if support is targeted 
towards four main characteristics and features of rural development: to provide 
employment; to generate economic activity related to farming; to maintain economic 
viability and sustainable vitality in remote areas; and to provide environmental and 
cultural amenities. 
 
15. Crucially, food production and food security are not identified as public goods or as 
central pillars of the Consultation Paper. There are clear dangers with such an approach. 
To solely focus on the delivery of environmental outcomes by farmers and to support 
farmers to remove cattle, lamb and other livestock from production would negatively 
impact on levels of food production. It must be considered whether increased 
productivity of economically viable farms will compensate for the cessation of farming 
activities elsewhere in the UK. The moral acceptability of financing programmes that 
diminish food production will need strong justification to stand public criticism at times 
of food insecurity. This issue is increasingly complicated due to the potential impact of 
trade agreements and the role of tariffs – will Brexit for instance lead to the availability 
of cheap, low quality produce or increase the cost of food on the market? It should be 
borne in mind that two of the objectives of CAP are to provide a fair standard of living 
for farmers and to provide reasonably priced goods for consumers – the direct payments 
are partially aimed at securing this. 
 
(III) Environmental Imbalances 
 
16. Despite referring to a ‘Green Brexit’ and numerous statements indicating that the 
English agricultural policy will be environmentally friendly, there are numerous points 
of concern within the consultation document. 
  
17. In considering the direct payments and also reform of CAP, suggestions can be seen to 
remove/reduce cross-compliance requirements, greening criteria and evidential 
requirements. There is discussion of regulatory burdens and the need to reduce and 
simplify these. This is worrying as, whilst some may be excessive, in general the 
regulations are there to incentivise environmentally-friendly behaviour. Flaws exist, but 
these could be addressed through developing and reforming the approach, rather than 
discarding the approach entirely – it seems to be very much a case of throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater.  
 
18. Linked to this, whilst the proposed agri-environmental schemes discussed below are 
positive to see, they tend to be individual projects rather than taking a holistic approach. 
This risks a silo-ed or piecemeal approach that does not reflect the nature of the 
environment, with permeable boundaries and the potential for an activity to pollute 
multiple environmental media or come from numerous sources. Hence we see 
integrated approaches in the Industrial Emissions Directive (heavily influenced 
originally by UK legislation on integrated pollution control), Natura 2000 Networks for 
conservation, and on-going attempts to address diffuse water pollution. 
  
19. Whilst separate legislation can and should regulate these areas, the potential substantial 
positive or negative impacts agriculture can have on the environment means that having 
mutually supportive policies is essential. CAP, although flawed, has evolved to promote 
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compliance and overall environmentally friendly behaviour. Post-Brexit, it is essential 
that agricultural policy/policies across the UK promote environmental protection in a 
holistic fashion and avoids reverting to historical, silo-ed and reactive approaches. 
 
20. The proposed environmental schemes are to focus on creating new environmental 
outcomes and services, rather than also maintaining and advancing existing features, 
landscapes and services. This ‘greening’ of payments aims at improving environmental 
management in the farmed countryside and enhancing environmental benefits appears 
crucial. Farmers must be paid to maintain and advance the positive environmental 
outcomes/services they create/have created. Receiving support should not only be 
about creating new outcomes/services. When reading the Consultation Paper, it appears 
that only the latter will be rewarded. This is a huge worry since enhancing 
environmental benefits is critical to create strong buffer zones, stepping stones and 
wildlife corridors. Ecological and natural connections are needed between existing sites 
to build a resilient network with green corridors.  
  
21. Further, active management practices from farmers and land-owners rather than passive 
reaction to changes should be the driver of future policy.  
 
22. The more targeted an Environmental Land Management Scheme Contract is, the better 
the outcome will be for the environment. However, such targeted approaches will 
constrain all parties to the agreement as well as being quite resource intensive. It is 
crucial therefore to ensure that such schemes are well-thought out, suitably tailored and 
appropriately rewarded. 
 
23. If there are too many practical or financial constraints under the new contracts then it 
will result in low uptake from farmers – this may be because it involves requiring 
farmers to farm in a manner contrary to their inclination or desires (e.g. changing from 
a cattle to dairy or pig farmer), it is infeasible for the size, location or quality of their 
farm or because it is simply economically unviable. 
 
24. The financial support during the transitional period and the schemes themselves are 
intended to facilitate changes in farming practices that will accord with these schemes. 
However, the current proposals indicate a focus on achieving environmental outcomes. 
Whilst obviously desirable, having a scheme that only rewards outcomes risks putting 
farmers off making the initial costly changes – essentially if the environmentally 
friendly behaviour is guaranteed to be costly but the substantial rewards may not 
materialise, why would farmers take the risk? Consequently, one variation of this in 
environmental governance is to avail of rewards focussed on procedures/steps, as well 
as on outcomes. This would provide some security to farmers provided that they could 
establish that they took X steps in such and such a manner. Further rewards could also 
be provided on achievement of milestones. Such rewards should bear in mind the level 
of costs involved for farmers, as well as the societal benefits of the various outcomes at 
all stages. 
 
25. Further, any such schemes need to provide some long-term certainty for farmers and 
for environmental protection. Farmers cannot work on short time spans, but need to 
determine what investments are worthwhile and will guarantee financial reward. If the 
policy might change in the meantime, then there is no point in investing. Hence, a group 
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of Welsh farmers suggested a period of 30 years or longer for establishing a policy.2 
However, the nature of parliamentary sovereignty and the potential for governments 
(new or current) to change policy and law makes it questionable whether any 
government can truly guarantee the longevity of such schemes. 
 
26. In this regard, it should also be borne in mind that some farms may struggle more to 
make capital investments, may not be able to risk diversify through growing multiple 
crops/engaging in other economic activities and also may not be able to survive 
economically if they do not receive a regular income year-in, year-out. In other words, 
once again, small, less-profitable farms will be worst hit if the schemes are not suitably 
tailored. 
 
27. When considering environmental protection, the Consultation Paper is very similar to 
the 25 Year Environmental Plan rather than a bill. It sounds more aspirational and lacks 
a real drive towards actual change and establishing relevant tools and mechanisms to 
deliver agri-sustainability. 
  
28. A very worrying feature, alongside the simplification of procedures and regulations, is 
the proposal to reduce, remove and improve inspections. Trust is a wonderful trait, but 
farming is an economic activity and environmental compliance can be costly – non-
compliance may make financial sense in a regulatory vacuum. The use of incentives 
and deterrents are both valuable tools to encourage compliance (Becker 1968; Abbot, 
2009; Brennan, 2016) and softer mechanisms, including some self-monitoring can play 
a useful role (Macrory, 2006), but at the end of the day agricultural producers are not 
‘customers’ and we should not rely heavily on self-regulation or self-monitoring. 
Claiming that the current regimes are not effective is not a reason to scrap them – 
numerous reasons can exist for their limited effectiveness, including the lack of 
sufficient resources.  
 
29. Self-monitoring, individually or in the context of a group scheme/organisation, might 
be valuable as a complementary mechanism – encouraging whistle-blowing and 
reporting by the public may also assist, but the role of independent, expert monitoring 
is fundamental to environmental regulation and therefore to ensure compliance also 
with agri-environmental schemes. 
 
30. Similarly, suggestions of reducing penalties and trying to avoid holding farmers liable 
for environmental offences should not be adopted lightly. Penalties tend to be on the 
lower end of what is provided for in the legislation, if anything is imposed at all. A few 
exceptional cases make the headlines, but these typically are ones involving waste 
where the defendants have made considerable sums by breaching environmental law. 
Nor should it be cast at the door of the EU that the penalties are disproportionate or 
unfair. The EU provides great flexibility to Member States to provide for environmental 
offences and penalties, provided that they are ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’. 
The policy and legislative regime should maintain this approach, in order to facilitate 
an effective deterrent – flexibility can be built in through considerations of ‘fault’ or 
                                                 
2 Jane Ricketts Hein, Eifiona Thomas Lane and Arfon Williams, The Future of the Welsh Uplands after the 
Common Agricultural Policy : Stakeholder Policy Priorities, May 2017, 
https://uplandsalliance.files.wordpress.com/2017/06/future-of-the-uplands-post-cap-report-final.pdf  
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defences, as well as through the numerous stages environmental actions go through 
before leading to a prosecution. 
 
(IV) Devolution  
 
31. The Health and Harmony Consultation Paper barely touches upon devolution. 
Agriculture and environmental protection are devolved competences according to the 
devolved settlements. Four different agricultural policies across the UK could be 
adopted with different schemes established across the devolved regions. It is likely that 
the design of a new agricultural policy in Wales will be driven by the ‘sustainable 
management of natural resources’ and its holistic and value-driven approach to 
environmental protection, as enshrined in its legislative framework – notably the Well-
being of Future Generations (Wales) Act 2015 and the Environment (Wales) Act 2016.  
 
32. The absence of the principle of subsidiarity can be felt within the Consultation Paper 
where it is replaced by the principle of commonality, which is now at the centre of UK 
Government policies. This modification in the framing of policies away from the 
regions (with subsidiarity) towards the centre (with commonality) forces the regions to 
conform to the will of the centre rather than formulating their own policies. This radical 
change could be detrimental to the devolved administrations and their powers and could 
place them at a disadvantage with a lack of input into UK-wide policies. In the long 
term, this reversal in the framing of policies and in principles will negatively impact 
the rights that the devolved regions had under EU law (Engel and Petetin, 2018). 
 
33. The implications of the Wales and Scotland EU Continuity Bills need to be considered 
in detail as well as the impact of the Common Framework Document. 
 
34. Regarding the common frameworks, it is worth noting that the regional administrations 
so far have identified several points relevant to agriculture that are thought to require a 
common framework. The same is not true for environmental protection, with some 
issues considered to require no common framework (including water quality). This is 
unfortunate as the two areas are so closely linked, that productive discussions between 
all four regions are required to develop effective policies. Whilst the areas are devolved 
and all four can go their own route, some basic standards, principles and cooperative 
procedures should be set and maintained, as well as providing for issues regarding 
cross-boundary impacts. 
 
35. In the context of agricultural policy, the English agricultural policy could impact 
significantly upon other regional agricultural policies – as the default if the regions do 
not act (e.g. in Northern Ireland due to no government in Stormont), in contributing to 
the common frameworks that are relevant (depending on the role of each region in 
developing the common frameworks, the pre-existence of an English policy could play 
a considerable role), simply from being a physically neighbouring piece of land (since 
nature is permeable) and where the farmers are typically competing in the same 
markets.  
 
36. Further, the allocation of funds for agricultural support across the four nations of the 
UK will impact on the design of agricultural policies in the devolved administrations. 
The justification of costs to Treasury will most likely be based on some kind of ‘public 
money for public goods’ formula. But any new fund and programme created should 
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allow for some differences and disparities within the UK. However, the question must 
be asked as to whether any new established formula would reflect the geographical, 
topographical and economic differences across the devolved administrations. These 
differences and the broader context within which farming in the four regions operate 
highlight ‘the need for differentiating policies within the UK– reflecting both the 
existing practices of subsidiarity and devolution’ (Gravey & Dobbs, 2018). 
 
(V) The WTO Agreement on Agriculture and the future of agricultural support in the 
UK  
 
37. Since the establishment of the Agreement on Agriculture, a conservative interpretation 
of ‘income foregone’ under Annex 2 for environmental programmes has been adopted 
by the EU. However, what is the baseline for measuring support? What do we measure? 
How do we measure it? The text of the Agreement on Agriculture is silent on these 
factors. The counterfactuals are unknown. Thus, there is no reason why the UK should 
adopt a strict interpretation. The strict interpretation adopted by the EU does not set a 
precedent. Further, income foregone focuses on financial and economic incomes not 
environmental outcomes. 
  
38. The immediate notification of payment for ecosystem services post-Brexit under the 
green box could negatively impact on the UK if the schemes are not consistent with the 
criteria under the green box. Other countries could seize the opportunity to challenge 
these schemes in front of the WTO to set a precedent against the (ab?)use by powerful 
countries of the green box. Keeping the support under the amber box for a short period 
of time whilst transitioning from area/land-based payments to 
ecosystem/environmental services payments would allow for the new schemes to be 
tested and framed in compatibility with the green box in the long term.  
 
39. Relying on the amber box for a transition period only (rather than indefinitely) would 
be more politically acceptable to WTO members who do not benefit from the AMS. 
Thus, the amber box could provide a pathway for transition from area/land-based 
payments to environmental outcome-based payments. In the long term, the green box 
provides the best opportunity to secure WTO combability for UK domestic support 
post-Brexit - but only to the extent that payments are not restricted to ‘income foregone’ 
interpreted in a strict manner (see comments made by Ludivine Petetin at the Game and 
Wildlife Conservation Trust All-Party Parliamentary Group in March 2018, 
https://www.gwct.org.uk/policy/appg/march-2018/). 
 
40. Further, UK farmers are protected by EU tariffs. Once the UK is removed from this 
protective bubble, UK farmers will be subject to price volatility in world markets where 
the price of commodities changes on a daily basis. Post-Brexit UK farmers are going to 
have to compete on the world scene and it is going to be a very harsh environment for 
them.  
 
41. Trade policy should be clearer before the Agricultural Policy is designed. However, the 
difficulty is that both policies need to be developed in collaboration with each other – 
as both will and should influence the other. Overall, UK trade policy should support 
UK agricultural policy. Similarly, it is essential that a clearer environmental policy be 
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developed, with substantive goals and principles, which should likewise inform and 
support UK agricultural policy – and vice versa. 
 
 
42. Overall, the Consultation Paper varies in approach and quality. There is next to nothing 
regarding devolution and the significance for regions other than England. When it 
comes to environmental protection, it sounds more aspirational and lacks a real drive 
towards actual change and establishing relevant tools and mechanisms to deliver agri-
sustainability. Some greater specificity is found when considering the role of 
technology or developing competitive approaches, and even more precise again when 
considering how to simplify regulation or reduce the payments from the BPS.  
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